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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
nlRs.

~1.

E. HAMILTON,
Appellant,
vs.

No. 6215

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation,

Respondent.

FROM THE DISTRICT CouRT OF SALT LAKE. CouNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, HoN. M. J. BRONSON, JunGE.

APPEAL

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Appellant .alleged in her complaint (paragraph III
Complaint, Tr. 1), ''- - - at a point immediately west
of that place known as No. 114 East Seeond South, there
existed a -certain hole or cavity endangering and constituting a hazard to the safety of persons passing along
and upon said sidewalk.''
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(Paragraph IV complaint, Tr. 2) "- - - the defendant negligently and carelessly permitted said hole or
cavity to remain open and unrepaired and in a dangerous ·condition in and upon said sidewalk,'' (paragraph
V ·Complaint, Tr. 2) ''without fault on her part said
plaintiff stepped and fell i.nto said hole or cavity and
by means thereof was thrown to and upon the pavement
with great force and violence."
The above states the substance of the complaint.
Nowhere in· the pleading is there a des·cription of the
alleged hole or cavity nor does it appear that the defendant city knew or in the exercise of reasonable care ought
to have known that ,said hole or cavity existed upon said
walk.
The evidence shows that on March 23rd, at 9:30
A. M. (Tr. 26) plaintiff was walking west on Second
South and the first thing she knew (Tr. 27) she had
fallen down having ·caught her foot in a hole. It seemed
to be a ·pretty big hole. That she had passed there once
in a while before. (Tr. 36)
One, William Perry Sturges, testified on behalf of
plaintiff (Tr. 38) that he was walking 7 or 8 feet behind
her. There was .a hole in the pavement (Tr. 39). lie
picked her up and her legs were laying right beside the
hole. There were two little holes there. There is a
manhole on the south side and a water drain (Tr. 40)
on the north side. The manhole had ''city engineer''
marked :nn it. The hole Mrs. Hamilton fell in was about
10 or 12 feet from the manhole on the north side in the
alley there-on the sidewalk in the alley on a line 12
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or 14 inches \\Tide, 1:2 or 1-! feet long extending fron1 one
hole to the other. There is a sean1 on each side of the
line. (Tr. 41)
The above is all of the testimony relating to the
alleged defect. There is no description of the hole, its
depth, width or character, nor its exact location with
reference to the sidewalk. Nor is there any evidence as
to the defendant's knowledge of the existence .of such a
hole. Nor does it appear how the hole come to be there
or how long it had existed prior to the alleged accident.
We are left entirely to conjecture as to the nature
of the claimed defect. No evidence was offered or
received showing that the defendant city knew O! ought
in the exercise of reasonable care to have known of the
existence :of said defect.
The District Court granted defendant's motion for
a dire·cted verdict, the first two paragraph.s of which
read (Tr. 44) :

1. That from all of the evidence and from the
pleadings it does not appear that there is a cause of
action against Salt Lake City.
2. That there has not been established by the evidence any ngeligence on the part of Salt Lake City.
THE CoMPLAINT DoEs NOT S·TATE FACTs SuFFICIENT To

CoNSTITUTE. A CAUSE OF AcTION.

Stripping the complaint of its conclusions and considering only the allegations of fact we have the follow-
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ing:

That at all times herein mentioned there existed

a certain hole or cavity at 114 East S·econd South and
on March 23rd, 19·38, (the only time mentioned) plaintiff
stepp·ed and fell into said hole.

There is no allegation

that the .city had actual or constructive notice. Likewise
before a ·complaint of this kind can be said to state a
cause of action it must show the size, kind, location and
character of the defect. A slight defect is not actionable.
Certain defects might be permissible.
"It may be laid down as a general rule that
the complaint must contain all the facts which
upon a general denial the plaintiff will be .called
upon to prove in the first instance to prote-ct himself from a nonsuit, and show himself entitled
to a judgment. And this statement must be made
in 'ordinary and concise language and without
unnecessary repetition. The code provisions in
this respect are only declaratory of the .common
law and are applicable to all pleadings whether
in law or equity.
Under the rule just stated, it is evident that
a complaint is materially defective if, to lay the
foundation for a recovery, the pr·oof must go further than the allegations contained in the pleadings. It must be so framed as to raise upon its
face the question whether, admitting the facts
stated to be true, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment, instead of leaving that question to he raised
or determined upon the trial. For where a ·complaint shows no legal cause of action upon its
face, a judgment by default can no more be taken
than it can over a general demurrer.''
Vol. 1, Sutherland Code Pleading, Sec. 188,
page 122.
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''Legal conclusions in a pleading are stillborn
for all purposes, where they are stated in the
place ·of ultimate facts. ''

Chesney ~··s. Chesuey,
33 lTtah 503 at p. 511, 94 Pac. 989.
THE EVIDENCE FAILs To SHow NEGLIGENCE·
ON PART OF CITY.
Summarizing the evidence we have the following:
It \\'"as daylight and 9 :30 o'clock a. m. The place was
at 114 East Second South on the sidewalk in the alley.
The hole or cavity was located on a line marked by
seams on either side which line was 12 to 14 inches wide
and 12 to 14 feet long extending from a manhole to a
water drain. The plaintiff fell as she passed it.
The city is not an insurer. Its duty is to use ordinary care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks
in a reasonably safe condition for the ordinary uses to
which they are .subjected.

Ray vs. Salt Lake ·City,
92 Utah 412, 69. Pac. (2nd) 256.
There is no rule requiring the city to keep its streets
reasonably safe for travel.

Gage vs. City of Vienna, 196 Ill. App. 585.
Have .any facts been established by the evidence
from which negligence may he reasonably inferred~ The
jury would be required to speculate as to the alleged
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defect, its ~depth, width, length, location, the length of
time it existed, whether it resulted from w·e.ar or was
constructed as a part of the walk and served some useful
purpose, whether the city knew or ought to have known
of its existence or its location with respect to the use
made of the street.
The defect was apparently so small that plaintiff
could riot see it as she walked along. It was at a place
in an alley where she should expect to encounter a ·Change
in the surface of the way and was made obvious ·by being
located in a line 12 to 14 inches wide marked by two
seams ·extending fr~om a water drain 12 to 14 feet to a
manhole. Appellant's view was not ohstructed nor her
attention otherwise attracted. It was 9:30 o'clock in
the morning. No evidence was offered as to how said
defect came to be there or how long it had existed. There
i.s neither allegation nor proof that the city created the
alleged defe·ct. On the ·Contrary it is alleged that the
city ''permitted said hole or ·Cavity to remain open and
unrepaired and in a dangerous condition." (Ah. p. 3,
-complaint paragraph IV).
Plaintiff failed to prove that the ·city knew that the
alleged hole existed.
Plaintiff also failed to prove that the alleged hole
existed prior to the time of the injury.
The general rule is that a city is not liable for
injuries caused by defects in a sidewalk or street in the
absence of actual knowledge thereof or evidence that
the defect existed in the walk for a length of time suffi-
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cient to give the city a reasonable opportunity in the
supervision and inspection of its streets and walks as a
whole to ~dis-cover and repair it. In determining whether
or not the city had a reasonable opportunity to discover
and repair the defect the jury may consider the use of
the walk, the location and character of the defect, the
amount of travel a~d other attending facts and circumstances. However such facts are not material unless
it is shown that the defect did in fact exist prior to the
InJury.

Rogers vs. City of Meriden, 1929 (Conn.)
146 Atl. 735, 71 A. L. R. 748, at 752.
In the above case the court points out clearly that
the placing of a drain and manhole in a street is not
actionable. Quoting from the opinion the ·Court said:
''The placing and maintenance of a catch
basin and cover is .a governmental function, and
does not of itself -constitute a defect in the highway, or give the traveler a right of action against
the city. It is the duty of the city to place and
supervise it with reasonable care, but no breach
of that duty suhjects the city to the statutory
penalty, unless and until the highway has been
rendered ·defective. The liability does not even
then attach, unless the city has failed either to
use reasonable care to discover the defect, or,
after actual or constructive notice, to use reasonahle care in curing it. ' '
I.n the case of Mablo vs. City of Lansing, (Mich.),
19-28, 220 N. W. 890, the court held that a plank with a
nail or spike in it placed on newly laid cement as a p-ath
within 48 hours of the injury did not give sufficient laps-e
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of time to cause the city to he charged with constructive
notice of the unsafe ·condition.
The city is not negligent unless it knew of the defect
or wa.s careless in not discovering and repairing it.
In the case of ·City of pamville
1932, 48 S. W. (2nd) 5, at p. 7:

V'S.

Vanarsdale, (Ky.)

"To render a city liable for dangerous conditions for travel of its streets and .sidewalks,
some officer or agency of the city having in_ charge
their maintenance must have knowledge of the
unsafe con<)ition, or it must have existed for such
a length of time as that knowledge of it could
have been obtained by the exe~cise of ordinary
care.
·Such requirements are conditions precedent
to liability and are as old as the exception imposing liability. * * *"
City of Ge:orgetown vs. Red Fox Oil Co.,
Ky. 19'29, 15 S. W. (2nd) 489;
· Gordon vs. City of New· Y ark,
1930, 239 N. Y. S·. 284;
Oklahoma ·City vs. Burns, 1935, (Okla.),
50 Pac. (2nd) 1101.

A failure to show that the city knew of the defect
or that it was careless in discovering and repairing it
is a failure to prove negligenc-e.
In the ·case of Dress vs. City of I-Iarrisburg, 1926,
(Pa.) 134 Atl. 400 at 401:
"A fatal defect in plaintiff's case is the entire
absence of any proof tending to show the exist-
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ence of such a depression at any tiine prior to the
accident. * * * The city cannot be visited with
constructiYe notice of an alleged defect 'vhich so
far a.s appears did not exist, and in any event
was not discovered before the accident. * * *
To infer the prior existence of the defect and
from that infer the city had notice thereof would
be basing one presumption upon another which
cannot be done.''

Malone vs. Union Paving Co., et al., 1932
(Pa.) 159 Atl. 21.
In the case of Meallady vs. City of New London,
(Conn. 1933), 164 Atl. 391 at P. 392, the court obs-erved:
'·'The city is not required to keep its streets
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition, but
it is sufficient if it uses reasonable care to keep
them in .such condition. The question in such a
case is not whether the condition was in fact
dangerous, but 'whether it had been there long
enough and is so conspicuous that it would attract
the attention of the city in the exercise of a reasonable supervision .of the streets.' ''
It is not sufficient to show that the ·city knew a
drain existed in the street at which point there was a
defect.
In the case of J ainchill vs. Schw·artz, ( C·onn.) 1933,
165 Atl. 689, the court observed:
''The notice which a municipality must receive as a condition precedent of liability for
injuries received by reason of a ·defective highway
must be notice of the defect itself which occasioned the injury and not merely of conditions
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naturally productive of that defect and subsequently in fact producing it.''

City of Phoenix vs. Clem, (Ariz.) 1925, 237 Pac. 168,
at page 172:
''Where a city improvement is not defective
when made, but later be·comes so, the rule is that
the city must have actual notice of a defect, or
the defect must have existed a sufficient length
of time to imply notice, before it is guilty of actionable negligence.''

Gregoire vs. City of Lowell, (Mass. 1925), 148 N. E.
37'6, the court observed :
''There can be no recovery for injuries resulting from a defective condition of a street
unless the muni~ipality knew or in the exercise
of proper care and diligence might have known of
the defect and have remedied it."
See also ·City of Hattiesburg vs. Reynolds, 86 So.
853, (Miss. 1921).
In this ·Ca.se appellant has not shown the existence
of a defect in the sidewalk. Assuming there was a defect
as was observed in Parker vs. City of Boston, (Mass.
1900), 56 N. E. 569, the plaintiff was bound to show
either that the defendant knew it, or, in the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence ought to have known it,
in season to remedy it. There was no evidence that the
defendant knew of the defect, if there was one; and,
in the absence of evidence to show how long it had been
there, it cannot be said that the defendant ought, in the
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exercise of reasonable care and diligence, to have known
of it, and remedied it.
The Rule of Constructive Notice is very well stated
in the case of ~-richolson V'S. City of Los Angeles' ( c·alif.
1936), 54 Pac. (2nd) 725, where the court quoting from
Taylor vs. Manson, (Calif.) 99 P. 410, 415 said at p.

727 of the opinion :
''While a municipality is required to exercise
vigilance in keeping its streets and sidewalks in
a reasonably safe ·condition for public travel, it
is by no means an insurer against ·accidents, nor
·can it be expected to keep the surface of its sidewalks free from all irregularities.''
The court further observed that:
''The doctrine of constructive notice cannot
be so applied as to effect .a change in the substantive ob.ligations of the city."
Also at page 728:
''There is no evidence of any prior event
which would put the city ·On inquiry as to the
existence of a dangerous break at this point, and
aside from the testimony that it had existed for
several months, that it was about an inch and
one-half high, and that the plaintiff thought it
was -caused by the root of a tree growing in the
parking beside it, there is no testimony with
regard to the defect itself. This, we think, is
insufficient to sustain a finding that, had the city
fulfilled its ~duty of reasonable inspection and
supervi.si,on of the streets of the eity as a whole,
it would have had actual knowledge of the break.
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There is a complete absence of proof as to the
method ·Or period of inspection or the nature of
the neighborhood in which defect existed or the
character of the use made of the walks in this
neighborhood. Because of the plaintiff's failure
to bring home to the defendant city a neglect of
its duty of inspection or knowledge of facts which
would have put it upon inquiry, the city cannot
be held to have had -constructive notice of the
defect.''
With like effect in the case of Meyer vs. City of San
R·afael, (Calif. 1937), 70 P. (2nd) 533, at p. 534 the court
said considering an act declaratory of the general law:
"It is not enough to show a dangerous condition of the property. The municipality must
have had notice and have failed to exercise its
opporunity to remedy the condition, * :); * ''
also at page 535 :

'' * * * Constructive notice ordinarily involves
as an essential element actual notice of facts and
·circumstances which are sufficient to put a prudent
person on inquiry as to the existence of the facts
with respect to )Vhich he is charged with constructive notice; that therefore, in order to charge
a city with constructive notic·e there must be some
element of conspicuousness or notoriety .so as
to put the city authorities upon inquiry as to the
existence of the defect ~o-r condition and its dangerous character * * *. ''
It is not alone sufficient to show prior existence of a
defect. Some event must appear to put the city on
inquiry or it must be shown that the city was negligent
in its inspection of the walks, or that it failed to repair
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the same after inspection and discovery of a defect.
Cities are not and ought not to be held liable on evidence
alone that a defect existed at the time of the accident
or even prior thereto unless some occurrence has brought
the defect to their attention. Their carelessness is a
failure to reasonably inspect streets. That duty implies
the emp1oyment of inspectors, the regular inspection
of streets and that the inspection be performed with
some regularity. In order to determine whether or not
a city is or is not careless in that regard the court must
kno\v ho'v many streets and walks there are, the u.se
1nade of the streets, the location, the frequency of the
inspecti·o.n and many other things material to such duty.
If the court should permit the plaintiff to recover merely
on a showing that a defect existed at the time of the
accident, cities would become insurers of the safety of
persons using the .streets.
It is common knowledge that defects are occurring
constantly in streets. If we were to apply our doctrine
of constru-ctive notice so that cities may become liable
for any defect found in its streets the subject should
be submitted to the legislature to provide the money
to pay the cost of cities insuring the streets. Cities face
a hazardous problem with sidewalk maintenance. If the
walks are kept too smooth they may become slippery and
dangerous. Roughness is necessary to make them .safe.
Joints must be provided for expansion approximately
every fifty feet and joints for contraction every twelve
or fifteen feet.

The walk must be marked in squares

to provide weaker places vYhere cracks might develop
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without effecting the surface. Many miles of walks require cities to shoulder great burdens of inspection and
maintenance. Heavy use together with weather conditions increase the problem.
To require cities to respond in damages when it is
shown that a person steps into a hole or cavity is to
require them to insure the safety of the person. To
require the city to keep its streets in a reasonably safe
eondi tion for travel is to require the impossible. To
require a city to inspect its streets and use reasonable
diligence to discover and repair defects is a reasonable
requirement. The rule ho\vever should be given a meaning that is reasonable and not so applied as to effect a
change of the substantive obligation of the city. The
words ''reasonable diligence'' should be given a practical application, considering the facts. The question
should be "did the city inspeet its walks as a whole and
if so was it negligent in discovering the defect."
In the instant case there was no evidence that the
city ·could h.ave found the defect had it inspected the
w·alk. Neither is there any evidence that the city failed
in its duty to inspect the walk or that it failed in its
duty to inspect the streets and walks as a whole or that
any event had occurred which would attract the cities'
attention or that it knew the walk was defective. As
w.as said in the case of Carsey· vs. City of New Orleans,
181 So. 819 at p. 820 ( 19,38 La.) :
"It is also to be horne in mind that, while
the courts have permitted recovery against a
municipality for injuries sustained beeause of de-
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fectiYe streets or side,ralks (as an exception to
the general rule that the sovereign is not responsible for the torts committed by it in the
exercise of a governn1ental function) they have,
nevertheless, imposed certain limitations upon the
rights afforded to plaintiffs in these cases which
are founded upon equitable principles. In other
words, the courts have readily realized that it is
impossible for a municipality to police each and
every street within its -confines with such vigilance
as to detect all slight defects which might be
brought about through conditi,ons of the soil, or
by exterior forces and that it would be unjust to
permit recovery except in cases where it has
plainly neglected to perform the obligation required of it by law.''
We submit that no evidence was offered to show
negligence on the part of the city and the motion was
properly granted.
THE NoTICE

OF

CLAIM Is INSUFFICIENT.

The third paragraph of Respondent's Motion for
Directed Verdict reads :

"3. That it does not appear from the evidence that a claim in the £o.rm required by Section
15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, was filed
with Salt Lake City, the defendant, within the
time and in the manner required by the provisions of said statute, and, therefore, the alleged
action of the plain tiff is harred by the provisions
of Sections 15-7-76 and 15-7-77, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933. '' (Tr. 44)
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The plaintiff i!ltroduced rn evidence a copy of a
letter (Exhibit A, Tr. 31, 44, 45) which reads as follows:
"Salt Lake City, Utah.
April 13, 1938.
Honorable Board of City Commissioners,
City and County Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
Gentlemen:
On March 23rd at 9 :30 A. M. while walking
just west of 114 East 2nd South, through a defect
in the sidewalk at that location I was injured by
falling and having cert·ain bones fractured near
my ankle to such an extent that I have had to
have same in a cast, and.move ab'out on crutches
since said injury. In view of the fact, that .since
s.aid date I have been confined at my residence
and have suffered extreme pain I feel that I
should be compensated for such injury to the
extent of not less than $500.
Respectfully submitted for your
immediate consideration,

''
She testified that she signed the original (Tr. 31)
and filed it with the defendant on April19,_1938. (Tr. 45).
Section 15-7-7·6, R~evised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
(quoted p. 14 appellant's brief) provides in part:
·"Every ·claim against a city * * * for danlages * * * shall * * * be presented to the Board
of c~ommissioners * * * in writing signed by the
claimant * * * and pr!op·erly verified, stating the
particular time at which the injury happened,
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and designating and describing the particular
place in which it occurred, and also particularly
describing the cause and circumstances of the
injury or damages, ·and stating, if kno,Yn to ·claimant, the name of the person, fir1n or corporation,
who created, brought about or maintained the
defect, obstructi~on or condition causing such accident or injury, and the nature and probable extent
of such injury, and the amount of damages
claimed on account of the same; such notice shall
be sufficient in the particulars above specified to
enable the officers of such ·city or town to find the
place and cause ·o.f s-uch injury from the description thereof given in the notice itself without extraneous inqury, and no action shall be maintained
against any city or town for damages or injury
to person or property, unless it appears that the
claim for which the action was brought was presented as aforesaid, and that such governing body
did not within ninety days thereafter audit and
allow the same. * * * ''
The right to institute an action 1n this class of
cases is purely statutory. It did not exist as common
law, .and therefore the ·conditions precedent fixed by the
statute which confers the right must be complied with,
or the action fails.

Hurley vs. Bingham,
63 Utah 589, 228 Pac. 213.
It is within the power of the legislature to impose
such conditions upon the right to sue cities and towns,
which are merely arms of the state government, as in
its judgment may seem wise and proper, and the condi'tions which are thus imposed are conditions precedent,
and ·Cannot be ignored either by the claimants or by the
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courts. In determining the effect of the above cited
statute upon this subjct it· is ·of utmost imp·ortance to
keep in mind its terms and provisions. An examination
of the cases will disclose that the terms of the statute
in the different cases cited by appellant vary to a considerable ·extent, which fact is overlooked by appellant
in citing cases in support of his view.

Berger vs. Salt Lake City,
5·6 Utah 403, at 408, 191 Pac. 233.
The purpose of our statute is very ch~ar, which is to
require every claimant to clearly state all of the ·elements
of his ·claim to the city for allowance as a condition
precedent to his right to sue the city. That the state
through its law making power has an absolute right
to impose such conditinns, all courts agree.

Sweet vs. Salt Lake City,
43 Utah 306, at p. 315, 134 Pae. 1167.
THE LETTER FILED
PuRPORT

BY

To

PLAINTIFF DID NOT

BE

A

CLAIM.

The letter was not verified. It stated the time to be
''March 23rd at 9· :30 A. M. '' The place is described as
"while walking just w-est of 114 East 2nd South.'' The
cause of the injury was des-cribed ''through a defect
in the sidewalk .at that location.'' The circumstances of
the injury was stated: "I was injure·d by falling.''
The statute (15-7-7'6 supra) requires "such notice
shall be sufficient in the particulars above specified to
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enable the officers of such city * * * to find the place and
cause of sucl1 injury from the description thereof given
in the notice itself without extraneous inquiry * * *. ''
The time ·stated in the letter does not refer to the
year of the occurrence. The place ''just west of 114
East Second South" is indefinite and uncertain. The
cause of the injury ''through a defect'' is most uncertain. No one could tell whether it was a depression, a
protuberance or some temporary obstruction or ex-cavation placed there by a third person. No information
at all is given by the word "defect". The circumstances
"by falling" do not help us in determining the nature
of the defect ·Or cause of the injury. It would be just as
reasonable to suppose that plaintiff stumbled over a
tempora~y obstruction or fell into a hole as to suppose
that she stepped into a depression. It would be impossible to determi·ne the pla:ce and -cause of suc:h injury
from the notice itself without extraneous inquiry. It
would likewise be just as impossible to determine the
place and ·cause of such injury by an examination of the
place mentioned in the notice.
The plaintiff could under the statement in the letter
claim that the injury occurred at one place just as well
as another. Without extraneous inquiry, yes without
interrogation of .plaintiff herself, the letter was wholly
valueless to the city. Not one of the many conditions
required by the statute was complied with. The letter
did not have any characteristics of a notice required by
the statute. Under it any kind of a claim could be
suecessfully made. The city was not afforded an oppor-
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tunity to examine the alleged defect and determine for
itself what the facts were. It was s!olely at the mercy
of the plaintiff and must rely upon her to point out the
''defect'' in a complaint or by evidence.
The notice was served April 19, 1938. Must one
assume the .accident referred to ,happened in 1938 ~ With
hundreds of miles of sidewalks to supervise and keep
in repair, all situated upon ground that is subjected to
the moisture .and extreme eo.ld of the Winter as well as
the dryneg.s and extreme heat of the .Summer, together
with the heavy use at driveways, alleys and intersections
by motor vehicles, and the added hazard caused by growing trees and constant excavation in and around the
same for furnishing the !services -of utilities to residents,
a valid reason is observed wby the legislature should
requ1re such conditi~ons before a city may be subjected
to suit.
J

Appellant contending that the letter is a valid claim
cited and relies upon the case of Connor vs. Salt Lake
City, 28 Utah 248, 78 Pac. 479. The claim in that case
was filed in 1902 pursuant to ~he provi·sions of Section
312, Chapter 20, Revised Statutes of Utah 1898, which
required claims to be filed :
''describing the time, place, cause, and extent
of the damage or inj~ry. ''
S-ection 15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, required
claims to be filed :
"stating the particular time at which the
injury happened, and designating and describing
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the particular place in \vhieh it occurred, and also
particularly describing the eause and -circumstances of the injury "" * * ·such notice shall be
sufficient in the particulars above specified to
enable the officers of such eity or to,vn to find the
place and cause of such injury fron1 the des-cription thereof giYeu in the notice itself \vithout
extraneous inquiry * * *. ''
The Connor case (supra) cited by appellant was
decided ~ oY. 11, 1904, and the said section 312 of the
1898 La,vs under which the Connor claim was filed was
amended by the next legislature by an act known as
Ch. 5, Laws of Utah 1905, approved Feh. 15, 1905 which
act was adopted expressly to avoid the effect of the
rule in the said Connor case. It will therefore be ,observed that the Connor case 'vas by legislative enactment
overruled and is not now the law in this state. This
illustrates the importance of checking the statute under
which the claim is filed.
We have considered the letter as a whole.
now separate it and consider its parts.

Let us

THE PLACE.

"Just west of 114 East S·econd South." We submit that this descripti,on does not meet the statutory
requirement ''and designating and describing the particular place in which it occurred" espe-cially when we
consider the evidence. It app·ears that appellant fell
at 114 East 2nd South (.Ah. 9~-17) and not west of it.
The hole or cavity was in a strip of cement marked
by a seam that extended from a manhole to a drain.
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According to the evidence a proper designation and
description ·could have been given. There seems to be
an alley referred to in the evidence that could have
been used to aid in the designation and description.
Without some outside inquiry one could not find the
alleged "defect" from the designation or description
given.
THE ·CIRCUMSTANCES

·OF

'THE INJURY.

''I was injured by falling and having certain hones
fractured near my ankle." Again we submit that the
statutory requirement is not met. ''And also particularly des-cribing the * * * ·Circumstances of the
injury." The city is entitled to know what appellant
claims in this regard. She testified that she stepped
into a hole or cavity. Such information could not have
been ohtaine,d from the notice. An examination of the
place referred to in the notice could not reveal any information as to the circumstances. The only inquiry
that could reveal the fact testified to would be one made
of appellant. If the statute means anything it certainly
means that claimant should describe the circumstances
as she claims the same t~o be. To permit a claim a.s indefinite and uncertain as the above letter to stand would be
to open the door to fraud. To disregard the requirement
that the circumstances be described would he the equivalent of disregarding the requirement of filing a notice.
It seems to us that one of the most important conditions
required as a condition pre·cedent to filing an action is
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that ·clain1ant give notice of the circumstances because
they can only be learned by the statement of the claimant.
THE CAUSE

OF

THE INJURY.

'' Throug'h a defect in the sidewalk'' does not meet
the requirement ''and also particularly describing the
cause * * * of the injury." Here again evidence was
offered that the ·cause of the injury was a hole or cavity.
Could one suspect that a depression, or hole or cavity
caused the injury des-cribed from the notice itself without
''extraneous inquiry~'' The word ''defect'' means
''want or absen·c.e of somethi'll·g necessary for completeness or perfection,'' W ebste.r 's New International
Dictionary. The city is entitled to know what the claimant claims the defect to be as -vvell as to 1be advised where
it is so that they may see for themselves. If this were
the only failure to comply with the statute, it would
invalidate the notice.
In the cas-e of Van Loan vs" Village of Lake Mills,
(~Wis. 1894), 60 N. W. 710, the notice was very similar
to the one a.t bar. It fixed .the place of injury and
described the ·Cause as ''while walking home on the sidewalk on Madison Street opposute the Moravian church,
in company with Prof. T·erry, owing to a defective sidewalk which caused me to fall. The court said:
" 'owing to a defective sidewalk on Madison
Street ·Opp·osite the Moravian church,' might possibly answer for 'the place where the damages
occurred,' if the defect itself was described so that
the place could be found from the defect. But
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there is no attempt to describe the defect. What
wa:s it~ The question is not answered. This
notice is a condition precedent to maintaining the
suit, and it must have reasonable certainty t!o be
of any use whatever. * * * This notice is a
blank, so far as any description of the defect is
concerned, and that is the very thing the Village
authorities wished, and had the right to be informed of. * * *''
In the case of Nicholaus vs. ()ity of Bridgeport,
(Conn. 1933) 16.7 Atl. 826, the assistant clerk of the city
made out the notice and told plaintiff to sign it which
he did without reading or learning its contents, and
which notice read in part:
'~For injuries the result of a fall on Chopsey
Hill road about 500 feet fr~o,m Fairview Avenue
going east on Dleeember 24th at 3 p.m. * * *''

The .conditions required by the Connecticut statute were
far more general than those required by the Utah law.
The law of Connecticut required a notice ''of such injury
and a general description ~of the ~same, and of the cause
thereof and of the time and place of its occurrence'' and
also providing that no notice shall be held invalid or
insufficient "by reason of an inaccuracy in * * * stating the time, place or cause of its occurrence,'' if there
was no intention to deceive the ·city.
The eourt held at page 827:
''the giving .of such notice as the statute requires
is a condition precedent to the maintenance of the
a.cJtiorr1, the obligation to -comply (p. 828) with the
statute rests upon the plaintiff, * * * The
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assistant city clerk could not waive ·compliance
'Yith the statute by aceepting a defective notice
or thereby stop the city from taking advantage
of a failure to meet the statutory requirements."
~ause

The

of the injury

"~as

held to mean the defect

or defective condition of the way which brought about
the injury. The court held further that the above notice
entirely failed to ·state the cause of the fall and hence the
injury.

Our statute

re~ds

''and also particularly de-

scribing the cause'' as well as the circumstances ·Of the
injury.

The particularity of the description must he

sufficient to enable the city to find the "cause of such
injury from the des-cription thereof given in the notice
itself without extraneous inquiry.''
In the case of Merr-ill vs. City of Springfield, (Mass.
1933) 187 N. E. 5·51, in considering a notice which referred to the cause of the injury thus:
wer~

''My injuries

due to a defective, dangerous condition of said

crosswalk in \vhich snow and ice accumulated as a result
of which I fell,'' the court held:
''This notice was insufficient since the cause
is not !specific and 'is equally consistent with an
excavation in the way, and obstruction upon the
way, an original mal-construction of the way, a
worn, uneven and irregular conditi~on of the surface of the earth, an accumulation of snow or ice
or both, or any of the many varieties of defect
which may exist in a way.' "
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THE TIME.

''On Mat·ch 23rd at 9 :30 A. M. '' does not fulfill the
condition ,., and stating the particular time at which the
injury happened.'' No year was specified. The notice
must show that the injury happened within 30 days
prior to the date of its proper filing with the city.
In the .case of Luke vs. City of J(eokuk, (Iowa 1926)
211 N. W. 583, the court considering a claim where the
time was thus : ''the evening of March 2i2nd' ', the year
of the alleged injury not being inserted in the notice,
said at Page 585:
"In this case the notice that was served on
the -city contained no statement of the year in
which the accident happened. It may have been
the present year, or any year in the past. The
statement is defective in this respect, and being
a c-ondition precedent to bringing of the action,
we are of the opinion that it does not comply
with the requirements ·of the statute, and hence
was no no t.1ce. ''
The notice in the instant case did not specify the
year. As the above ·court observed, quoting from White
vtS. Town of Stowe, 54 Vt. 510. ''so, if the notice does

not state that the injury happened within 30 days next
preceding its receipt, they (the city officials) might as
well say that the injured party had no claim against the
town.'' Pariol evidence is not permissible to supply the
legal requirements of the notice.

The claim is fatally

'

defective.
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THE

CLAil\I

\~VAs

NoT

VERIFIED.

The plaintiff concedes that the claim is defective in
this regard and ·cites the case of White vs. Heber City,
82 Utah 547, 26 P. (2nd) 333, and also other authorities.
The authorities almost unanimously hold defective claims
that are not Yerified as required by the statute.
Appellant says at page 30 (Appellant's brief) that
plaintiff's claim "\\,.as handled by respondent by the
usual method adopted for the disposition of such claims.''
No evidence was offered in support of this assertion.
Appellant further says that the reference of the plaintiff's alleged notice to a city department ''together with
the negotiations had between the (p. 31) respondent and
the city attorney's office sh~ow conclusiyely that respondent had notice of the claim and took some action thereon.'' The author of this statement has not read the
record. Nowhere is there any evidence of negotiations
between the city attorney and the appellant or the city
and any city department in relation to said notice or any
other matter.
Again appellant says: (Appellant's brief, page 32)
''The respondent's silenee, tog·ether with the action taken
regarding the claim, including the offer to pay appellant

$25.00 in settlement of respondent's liability, constitute
a plain representation to appellant respecting the
validity of her claim.''
read the record.

Again appellant has failed to

No evidence can be found respecting

an offer in compromise.

The only comp·etent evidence
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in the record is the silence of respondent and its failure
and refusal to consider the letter as a claim.
Appellant was asked by her attorney if she had
ever been notified that her claim had been allowed and
she answered: ( Tr. p. 32, A b. p. 11) ''A. No, excepting
I went to see Mr. Irvine, and he said they wouldn't accept
it, but he offered me $25.00 tn settle the case.'' Motion
was made· by respondent to strike the answer, (Tr. p. 32,
Ab. p. 11-12) and the court ruled that the portion (Tr ..
p. 32, Ab. p. 11 and 12) ''of the witness' answer where
she said '~Mr. Irvine offered her $2:5.00' is stricken from
the record.''
The only evidence then in the record is that "Mr.
Irvine" told the appellant that the city would not accept
her claim.
It is evident that ' 'Mr. Irvine' ' could not act f~or
the :c.ity without son1e .authority to d·o so a:nd no attempt
was made to show that the city offered to make a compromise or did anything but refuse to accept the appellant's claim. "Mr. Irivne'' is a stranger to this case
and to the respondent in the action. The motion wa·s
properly granted.
· The appellant urges that the city was not misled
to its injury by the defective notice. (Appellant's brief
p. 31) ''It was not shown at the trial that the respond. ent was prejudiced in any way by any alleged insufficiency of the claim.'' The burden of proof rested on
appellant. However no notice was given by the exhibit.
In the ·case of Rauber v. Wellsville, (N. Y. 1903), 82
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N. Y. S. 9, 11, the court in answering the argument that
the city vYas not misled to its injury by a defe-ctive notice,
said:
"It "\\'"ould be permissible for a clain1ant in
the same manner to escape the consequences of
failure to comply \Yith the provisions of the statute in not stating the tin1e of his alleged accident
or the nature of his claim, and in fact \Ve see no
reas·on \vhy he might not invoke the same doctrine
to relie-ve hin1 when he had failed to verify his
claim~ or had given verbal instead of written
notice thereof, or had filed his claim 11 instead of
6 months after the accident happened. In each
of these cases, in the place of ·compliance with the
absolute statutory requirement, he might substitute evidence, no matter how loo-se and inaccurate,
provided only a jury might he permitted to say
therefrom that the municipality had somehow
learned of the -details of the accident, and therefore had not suffered any determinable injury
from the omission * * *."
Claims must be verified as required by the statute
before an action against the city can be maintained.

Clawson vs. City of Ithica, 212 N. Y. S. 433;
Cole vs. City of Seattle,
(Wash. 1911) 116 Pac. 257.
In the case of Spencer vs. City of

Calip~atria,

(Calif.

1935) 49 Pac. (2nd) 320 the court states at p. 321:
''No right to bring such an action exists independent of statutory enactment and, in giving
such a right, the Legislature may pres-cribe the
proce-dure and conditions under which it may be
exercised. That such a claim must be verifi·ed is a
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reasonable provision which should not be held to
be ineffectual and meaningless.''
No WAIVER REsULTED FRoM A

FAILURE OF CITY's

GoVERNING BoDY To PoiNT OuT DEFECTS IN LETTER
FILED BY APPELLANT.

Appellant claims that a duty rests upon the city
to point out the lack of verification of appellant's letter
to the appellant if the city intended to rely upon it and
failing to do so a waiver resulted.

In the ·case of Chamberlain vs. City of Sag·immw,
(Mich. 1903) 97 N. W. 156 where the silence ,of the city's
governing body was urged as a waiver at p. 157 the court
said:
''The council took no action whatever, except
to receive the commuication and refer it to a committee. There was no waiver, unless it was the
duty of the council to· notify the claimant that
such notice was void, point out wherein it was
void, and give her an opportunity to present a
valid one. . Public rights are not, in my judgment,
to be thus waived. The liability of municipal corporations for defective streets and sidewalks is
purely sta.tutoty, and he who attempts to fasten
that liability upon the municipality is bound to
strictly comply with the statute. A waiver can
only be predicated upon some duty of the corporation to act. No such duty is imposed by the
statute, expressly or impliedly. After giving the
notice, both parties may rest, if they choose, and
as they did in this case, without further action
until the claimant sees fit to plant his suit."
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"'To 'YaiYe means in law, 'to relinquish intentionally a known right, or intentionally t~o do
an a~t inconsistent 'Yith claimiTI·g it'.''
Ridge~vay

vs. City of Escarnaba, (Mich.
1908) 117 N. W. 550.

Appellant urges that the latter part of the claims
statute supports his contention that the eity should point
out to appellant the f~ilnre to verify her c.laim if the city
is to rely upon it. In this contention the appellant is
entirely in error and has not carefully read the statute
and eases cited to support the contention. Let us now
analyze this argument.
Section 15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, provides at the end thereof:
''Every claim, other than claims above mentioned, against any ·city or town must be presented, properly itemized or des-cribed and verified
as to correctness by the claimant or his agent,
to the g~nverning body within one year after the
last item of such account or claim accrued, and if
such account or claim is not properly or sufficiently itemized or des-cribed or verified, the governing body may require the same to he made
more specific as to itemization ~or description, or
to be corrected as to the verification thereof.''
The first part of the statute refers solely to claims
for injuries alleged to have been caused by defeetive
streets and sidwalks.
Section 15-7-77, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, pr!ovides:
"It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to
any action or proceeding against a city or town
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in any court for the collection of any claim mentione-d in Section 15-7-76, that such claim had not
been presented to the governing body of such city
or town in the manner and within the time specified in Section 15-7-7·6; provided, that in case an
account or claim, other than a claim made for
da,mages on accournt of the wnsafe, defective, dangerous, or obstructed condition of any street,
alley, crossw·alk, w·ay, sidewalk, culvert or bridge,
is required by the governing body to be made
more specific as to itemization or description, or
to be properly verified, sufficient time shall be
allowed the -claimant to comply with such requirement.'' (Italics ours).
It will he noted that claims other than for streets
and sidewalk injuries _a year is allowed for filing and in
the event such .claims are not properly verified the city
may require a corrected verification. This does not
apply to elaims relating to stree)ts or sidewalks. Darhl
vs. S. L. C., 4:5 U. 544, 147 P. 622. The provision as to
verification of claims relating to sidewalks and streets
i·s absolute and unconditional, and reads; claims must be
"properly verified".
Appellant cites the following cases to .support his
contention that the -city waived verification of his alleged
notice of elaim hy its silence and failure to call the defects
to the attention_ of the appellant.

Bowma;n v.s. Ogden City,
33 U. 196, 93 P. 561;
Burton vs. Salt Lake City,
·69 U. 186., 253 P. 443, 51 A. L. R. 364;
Husbands vs. Salt Lake City,
92 U. 449, 69 P. (2nd) 491, at 499;
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Moran vs. Salt Lake City,
53 U. 407, 173 P. 702.
In the Bowman case (supra) a written notice was
filed \Yith the city December 21, 1903, claiming· injury
December 10, 1903. The notice was unverified. The
city inYestigated the claim, considered it on its merits
and adopted a report reconnnending payment of the
same and $5.00 \Vas paid to and received by Bowman
in satisfaction of the same. The court -observed that,
at page 204 (Utah), Chapter 19, p. 12, Sess. Laws 1903,
the statute under which the notice of cliam was filed,
provided:
''that claims of this character must be presented
to the city council in writing, signed by the claimant or his agent, properly verified, and describing
the tin1e, place, cause, and extent of the damage
or injury, and if the city council shall refu.se to
hear or consider a claim because not properly
made out, notice thereof must be given the plaintiff a;nd sufficient time allowed him to hav·e the
claim prop-erly itemized and verified. The plaintiff's claim was not properly made out as provided
by the statute in several particulars, principally
because it was not verified, and the extent ·of this
injury or damage not sufficiently described. The
city ·council, however, did not decline to consider
it, nor to investigate the facts, because the claim
was not properly made out. On the contrary it
treated the claim, and acted upon it, as though it
had been in full compliance with the statute. In
such case the defects ,of the claim presented were
waived, and were not thereafter available as a
defense to the action but on the ground that the
settlement and payment were in satisfaction of
plaintiff's elaim, a verdict ought to have been
directed for the defendant.'' (Italics ours).
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The statute under which the said claim was filed
was later amended to read substantially as it does now.
(February 15, 1905.) See Chap. 5, Laws of Utah, 1905,
page 5.
The rule in the Bowman case as applied to claims
relating t~o sidewalks and streets of cities is not now the
law in Utah and the ease is not in point. The rule may
have some application as to claims under the second part
of the statute, that is claims other than those relating
to sidewalks because of the provision in our present
statute above noted relating to the seeond .class of claims
to the effect that the -city may require correction as to
a defective verification. But even there it is doubtful
that such rule would apply if there is a total absence of
verification. H.ow ·could a verification be corrected if
there was none especially after the one year period had
expired~

This court has heretofore observed that claims under
our statute are divided into two -classes: one consists of
claims for damages or injury alleged to have heen caused
by unsafe streets :or sidewalks and the other .consists of
every claim other than claims above menti,oned. The
important question to decide is does the claim at bar
eome within the first or second class. Dahl vs. Salt Lake
City, 45 Utah 544 (548), 147 Pac. 622.
In the Burton ease (supra) the ~c.laim wa.s made to
recover damages for ~death of a girl by drowning in a
city owned and operated bath house, the said -claim being
made under the second -class of ·Cases.

The court ob-
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served at page 193 (Utah): "The statute requires that
in case a claim is deemed insufficient or defective in
certain particulars, the insufficiency or defect mu.st be
pointed out by the city. The city not having done so it
cannot now be heard to say that the claim is insufficient.''
Our statute no'v under consideration does not so provide.
Nevertheless the claim in that case was filed under the
second part of the statute which now provides that the
city may require correction as to verification where
defective. The Burton ease, .considering a claim under
the second class of claims as the Bowman case, did not
hold that the ·entire absence of verification could be
corrected. The case is not in point and has no reference
to claims for sidewalks or streets, where particularization and verifications are required as a ·condition precedent.
In the Husbands case (supra) the claim was filed in
March, 19·34, claiming an injury by reason of a sprinkling
wagon running over a boy on July 8, 1933, nearly eight
months prior. This claim likewise was filed under the
second class of cases where the city may require a verification to be made more specific. · The court ohserved
that, at page 465 (Utah: ''The claim here involved must
come under the latter portion of said section ( 15-7-76,
Rev. Stat. U. 1933) above quoted, referring to claims
other than those mentioned in the first part of said
:section," a~nd again rut page 4616: "It must he remembered that this claim falls under the second division of
section 15-7-76, which apparently does not require the
same particularly as is required by the first part of
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that section.'' This case is not an authority for the contention that the city waived a compliance with the statute
but on the contrary ·could well be cited by respondent to
illustrate that claims filed under the first part of the
clai~ S'tatute, claimant must particulariz·e and the
claims be verified in the manner required by the statute,
whereas such is not required of claims under the second
part of said section. The Husbands claim was verified
and the only question there was whether it was sufficient
in other particulars, which the court held were not required under the se-cond part of the claims statute.
The city is under no duty to examine claims for
defe-cts therein where they relate to injuries upon sidewalks and streets. It may take such advantage ,o.f such
claims filed as it ,chooses. As to ''every claim, other than
claims'' for streets and sidewalks described in the first
class of claims, if the claim ''is not properly or swfficiently itemized or described or verified" the -city "may"
require it to be made "·more spec·ific as to itemization
or description, or to be corrected a·s to the verification
thereof.''
The ·cases cited by appellant relate to the second
part of the statute where there is a dis-cretion which
might be construed as an implied direction to examine
the claim for defects and p·oint the same out to elaimant
if the city intends to take advantage of such defect.
The citation of such ·cases brings again before us rather
forceably the necessity of examination of the statute
under which the ,claim is filed.
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Appellant cites the Moran ·Case supra (p. 53 appellant's brief) with the connnent that Moran failed to
prove the giving of notice of any kind to the city. The
evidence shows that a letter was sent to the May.or and
City Council claiming payment for damage by overflow
of water into a conduit then being constructed for the
city, which claim \Yas made under the second class of
claims under the S~ta.tute and the court observed at page
411 (Utah):
''We are clearly of the op1n1on that under
the ·clear language of the statute the a:etion of
the plaintiff did not meet the requirements of
section 312, supra. Accepting the statement of
Mr. Moran as to the contents of the communication sent to the Mayor and city eouncil, it does
not appear that that claim was verified as to its
correctness, or that it was itemized, or described,
or that it contained any of the facts required by
the provisions of the section. 'To hold that the
communication ·clairn.ed to have been sent to the
city was a compliance with the statutes, without
some action on the part of the city waiving such
requirements, would be, in effect, to nullify the
provisions of the statute and to bind eities, regardless of whether claimants had advised them
in any particulars as to the nature of the claim,
and to that extent at least would effect the repeal
or repudiation of what the Legislature considered
to be a prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit
against municipalities.''
Appellant cites further the case of Hurley vs. Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (App. brief p·. 57) and
quotes an extract from the opinion urging that a ''proper
application'' of the statute would suggest that a waiver
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had resulted because the city failed to call attention to
defects in the claim. In that case a minor, eight years
of age, was injured on a street and his guardian ad litem
commenced an action without the filing of the claim
required by the first part of the statute relating to streets
and sidewalks. The plaintiff cited the ·case of Sw·eet vs.
Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 Pac. 1167, and Berger
vs. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233, where claims
were presented to the ·city under the first part of the
statute and actions commenced for damages additional
to the sums ·Claimed in the notice filed. The plaintiff
in the Hurley ca·se urged that the rule permitting recovery for purely consequential damage arising out of
injuries described in the notice o{ ·claim but which
consequential damages were not claimed in the notice
was an authority for the proposition that a minor child
not capable of filing a notice should not be prevented
fr.om bringing his action. The -court held that a minor
child if he expects to recover must file a claim and
further pointed out that the -court in the eited cases held
that damages may he recovered only for the injuries
described in the claims. That consequential damages
not known at the filing of the claim may if properly!
pleaded he recovered for only those injuries described
in the r:laim. The court in further considering the cited
cases then observed at p. 593 (63 Utah):
·"After all, as we conceive the purpose of the
law, when the injured party has p-resented his
claim stating the time, place, cause, and circumstances of his injury and the extent of his damages as far as known to ( p. 594) him, he has fairly
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and fully con1plied \Yi th the spirit and intent of
the statute. But this is far from excusing the
failure to present any clain1 at all within the limit
fixed by la""· There is a lcide distinction between
presenting a defect·ive cla.im W'hich at least names
the time, place, and circumstances of the injury
and in presenting no .claim at all. In the first
supposed case the municipality is at least notified
sufficiently to investigate the merits of the clailn,
\vhich, evidently, is the 1nain purpose of the statute. In the second supposed case the city recei Yed no notice at all, and the very purpose of
the statute is defeated. By this we do not mean,
however, that if the municipality has notice otherwise than by presenting a claim, presentation of
the claim is thereby rendered unnecessary or immaterial. By the great weight of authority as
we read and interpret the adjudicated cases, the
presentation of a claim within the time fixed by
law is a condition precedent to the bringing of an
action in cases of this kind. The right to institute an action in this class of- cases is purely
statutory. It ,did not exist at common law, and
therefore the conditions precedent fixed by the
statute which confers the right must be complied
with, or the action fails.'' Berger v. Salt Lake
City, supra. (Italics ours).
The court in the Dahl case (supra) above quoted
observed at p. 549 ( 45 Utah):
"That the Legislature may, by statute, prescribe conditions up,on w·hich swits may be brought
and maintained against a municipality is conceded.''
The examination of the decisions considering the
first part of the statute relating to streets and sidewalks
reveals that the court consistently requires the claimant
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to c~o·mply with the ·conditions set out in the statute or
as said in the I-I ur ley and the Berger cases (supra) the
conditions precedent fixed by the statute which confers
the right of action must be complied with, or the action
fails. This same rule applies to the claims under the
second subdivision of the statute. As an analogy it was
observed by the court in the Hurley case (supra) quoted
at page 57 ~of appellant's brief, there is a wide distinction bet,veen a defective verification and no verification
at all. This was considered by the court in the ease of
White vs. Heber City, 82 Utah 547, 26 P. 2nd 333 where
the court held that the verification though defective,
p. 555 (Utah) ''yet, in substance stated enough to comply
with the statute and to invoke considerati~on and action."
A total absence of verification would not invoke consideration and action by the ·court.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney.
GERALD IRVINE,
MARION RoMNEY,

Assistants.
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